The short answer
Key attestation gives more confidence that a key is stored in the device hardware-backed keystore. The attestation certificate chain describes the key, and a verifier reads that chain to decide whether the key is hardware-backed.
Marka signs each capture record with such a key. The signature shows that the record was made with that key, and the photo digest sits inside the signed record, so a changed file fails. Neither the signature nor the attestation proves that the photographed scene is true.
The Marka seal key
Marka creates an EC P-256 key in the AndroidKeyStore provider. If the phone reports StrongBox, the app asks for a StrongBox key first. If that fails, it falls back to a regular Keystore key. The key signs each capture record with SHA256withECDSA.
Key creation can take seconds, so the camera screen starts it in the background when it opens. The app waits up to 3 seconds for the key and up to 3 seconds for the signature. If a wait ends, or signing fails, the photo is saved without a seal.
What the Marka verifier checks
- The photo bytes, without the seal, must match the SHA-256 in the signed record. If not, the result is Changed.
- The record signature must verify with the certificate leaf key, which must be P-256. If not, the result is Invalid seal.
- Each certificate must sign the next one, and the root must be a pinned Google hardware-attestation root. If not, the result is Untrusted.
- If the status list loads, no certificate in the chain may be on it. A listed certificate gives Untrusted.
- The attestation must name the Marka app and the expected challenge. If not, the result is Untrusted.
- The attestation and KeyMint security levels must each be TrustedEnvironment or StrongBox, not Software. If not, the result is Untrusted.
- The signing certificate digest must match one of the Marka keys in the verifier trust list. If not, the result is Unknown app.
- Warnings apply to a phone that is not locked or whose boot state is not verified, a mock location, a location fix older than 5 minutes, or an invalid time proof. A warning gives Warning. Otherwise the result is Verified.
What attestation does not prove
Attestation describes a key and the device state when the key was made. It does not describe the photo or the scene.
Clock and location values come from the phone. When the online time proof succeeds, it shows that the record existed by the signed online time. The app says this does not prove the exact capture time.
The chain is a snapshot in time. Certificates can be revoked later, so a chain that passes now can fail after a revocation. The browser checks revocations only when the status list it loads from /check/attestation-status.json is available.
No seal means a supported proof was not found. It does not, by itself, mean the scene is false.
Checking a seal yourself
- Run the file through /check first. It checks the file in your browser and shows one result label.
- For your own validation, use the attestation verification library Google publishes, or a verifier that checks the whole chain and the revocation list.
- Validate on a server you control, not on the phone that made the photo.
- Keep the original file unchanged. A changed file fails the digest check and shows Changed.