Prove when and where a photo was taken

Check the capture record.

The short answer

Keep the original file, capture it with a tool that signs time and location on the device, and show it has not changed since. A visible stamp helps people read the facts; a cryptographic seal helps them check the file.

The image shows what was photographed. The stamp and metadata report what the device recorded. The seal shows whether the file and record are intact and came from the expected key. None proves the scene was honest or the clock correct.

What EXIF can and cannot prove

EXIF records capture time, GPS coordinates, device model, orientation and exposure in image files. Android exposes these fields through ExifInterface, including date and GPS tags.

EXIF helps sorting and review, but it is ordinary file data. It can be edited, forged or removed with common tools, and apps can strip it when re-encoding. A present EXIF field is a claim by whatever wrote it; an absent field is not proof of manipulation. A phone clock can be wrong, and location accuracy varies with the provider, sky view and network. Android reports an estimated accuracy, which is not a guarantee.

Many messaging apps recompress images before delivery, and some remove metadata. A screenshot is a new image of the screen, so it has no original metadata or seal.

What a hardware-backed seal adds

A seal is a cryptographic record made at capture. Marka digests the original file, signs a capture record with a phone-held key, and can include a hardware attestation certificate. Android Keystore supports secure-hardware keys with an attestation certificate chain, documented by Android's key attestation guide.

The seal asks whether the file matches a signed record and whether the signing key came from an attested device. A verifier checks the signature, digest and attestation chain. If the image bytes change, the digest no longer matches.

Marka's public verifier, /check, runs in your browser and does not upload the file. It shows what held and what did not, including no seal and untrusted-chain cases. A seal can include a trusted time-authority timestamp under RFC 3161. That shows the signed record existed by a stated time, not that the phone clock was right.

Chain of custody in practice

  1. Capture the original in an app that seals the file and records the time and location.
  2. Keep the original unchanged. Do not crop, annotate, re-save or send it through a tool that re-encodes it.
  3. Record who captured it, who held it and when it moved. Keep exports and reports with the original.
  4. Verify with /check before you rely on it, and keep the result with the record.
  5. If a copy is needed, identify it as a copy and keep the original available.

A seal proves integrity only if the file you verify is the file that was sealed. That is a chain-of-custody problem as much as a cryptography problem.

What proof cannot do

A seal proves file integrity and origin from a key. It does not prove the scene is true, that the worker was present, that a note is accurate or that a GPS coordinate is exact. A phone can photograph a screen, a print or a staged scene. A clock can be wrong, and location can be approximate or spoofed.

Attestation is evidence about a key and device at a point in time, not a guarantee about every fact. Hardware can be compromised, keys can be used by someone with access to the unlocked device, and verification software must be trusted. Legal admissibility depends on your jurisdiction; a valid seal is evidence to assess, not an automatic ruling.

The honest claim is narrow: the original file matches a capture record signed by an attested key, and the record says when and where the device reported the capture. That is stronger than a plain photo, but it is not proof that the scene is true.

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